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Abstract 
This study examined the relationship between a series of individual difference measures 
and belief in political and medical conspiracy theories. Participants (N=323) rated 20 
conspiracy theories (10 medical, 10 political) and completed a set of questionnaires. Belief in 
political conspiracies was strongly positively correlated with belief in medical conspiracies. 
Belief in both conspiracy types was correlated with low self-esteem, low Conscientiousness, 
more right-wing political views, younger age, and greater belief in the benefits of Alternative 
Medicine. It was also correlated with religiousness and gender. Low Emotional Stability and 
Agreeableness were also correlated with belief in political conspiracies, and higher education 
level was correlated with belief in medical conspiracies. The findings generally demonstrated 
support for a monological belief system. Implications and limitations are discussed. 
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Introduction 
Conspiracy theories (CTs) are usually referred to as a set of beliefs where the cause of 
an event is thought to be due to a secret plot by multiple people working with a clear goal in 
mind, (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009). It is generally agreed that conspiracy theories form part 
of a monological belief system: people adopt a conspiracist worldview tending to accept or 
reject all types of conspiracy theories (Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al., 2011; Wood, Douglas & 
Sutton, 2012). Sunstein and Vermeule (2009) suggested that belief in conspiracies are a means 
for people who feel powerless or disadvantaged, to explain events that are difficult to conceive 
of, such as terrorist acts (Uscinski & Parent, 2014; Sullivan, Landau & Rothschild, 2010). 
Over the past five years there has been a great increase in psychological studies on CTs 
(Barron et al., 2014; Brotherton & French, 2014; Douglas et al., 2016;van Prooijen, et al., 
2015). They have been concerned with the measurement of CTs, as well as individual 
difference correlates of those beliefs, including self-assessments such as the need for 
uniqueness (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2017) 
This study aims to replicate and extend studies on the correlates of CTs. We examined 
self-esteem and personality trait correlates to replicate other studies in this area. Conspiracist 
ideation has been linked to self-esteem maintenance, where believing that others have engaged 
in malevolent action means the individual who holds the conspiracist belief experiences a more 
positive self-image (Robins & Post, 1997). With regards to personality factors, low 
Agreeableness and high Openness to experience have also been found to be associated with 
9/11 conspiracist beliefs (Swami et al. 2010). Exposure to conspiracy theories about the 
government decreases trust in the government and can have immediate and long-term negative 
effects on political attitudes and engagement (Einstein & Glick, 2015; Jolley & Douglas, 
2014a; Kim & Cao, 2016). In this study we examined both political involvement (how many 
times they have voted) as well as political beliefs (left vs right wing). 
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Studies show a strong association between conspiracy beliefs and greater belief in 
pseudoscience (Lobato, Mendoza, Sims & Chin, 2014). As alternative medicine is not based 
on scientific evidence and various studies have suggested that individuals seek the use of 
alternative medicine to gain control and empowerment (Andrews, 2002; Bishop, Yardley & 
Lewith, 2007; Thompson, 2003). We believe this is a unique contribution to this literature. 
Further, the relationship between demographic factors and conspiracist belief has been 
explored. The tendency to attribute agency and intentionality where it does not exist (known 
as ‘hypersensitive agency detection’) has been found in individuals who were more likely to 
believe in a range of conspiracy theories, and this was accounted for by lower education level 
(Douglas, Sutton, Callan, Dawtry & Harvey, 2016). Beliefs in conspiracy theories may be 
influenced by improved education (Bartlett & Miller, 2010).  
The tendency to assign agency and intentionality where it does not exist is linked to 
conspiracy belief. This tendency has been used to explain why people are religious and 
superstitious (Barrett, 2007), and thus may explain why conspiracist beliefs are consistently 
found in individuals who also hold religious beliefs and beliefs in the paranormal (Darwin, 
Neave & Holmes, 2011; Stieger, Gumhalter, Tran, Voracek & Swami, 2013). In this study we 
looked at how religious people said they were and its relationship to beliefs in both CTs.  
Current Study 
This study aims to investigate the relationships between individual difference factors 
and belief in two conspiracy theory types, political (involving action by the government) and 
medical (involving action by the medical or pharmaceutical industry). Medical conspiracy 
theories were chosen partly due to differing results observed with regards to education (Klonoff 
& Landrine, 1999), and in part because belief in them has, like political conspiracies, been 
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associated with negative consequences, such as not receiving advised healthcare (Jolley & 
Douglas, 2014b). We used step-wise regressions to explore to what extent personality variables 
and political/medical beliefs showed incremental validity over standard demographic 
variables. 
It was firstly predicted that belief in both CTs would be negatively correlated with 
Agreeableness (Hypothesis 1A), and Self-esteem (Hypothesis 1B), but positively correlated 
with Openness to Experience (Hypothesis 1C).  The second hypothesis was that education 
qualification would be negatively correlated with belief in political and medical conspiracy 
theories (H2). These hypotheses attempt to replicate previous studies using different CTs, 
populations and measures of personality (Swami et al., 2010) 
The third hypothesis was that religiousness would be positively associated with  
conspiracy belief (H3). Fourth, it was hypothesized that belief in political and medical 
conspiracies would be negatively correlated with political affiliation (i.e. more left-wing views; 
Hypothesis 4A) and tendencies to vote (i.e. fewer tendencies; Hypothesis 4B). More left-wing 
attitudes (i.e. democratic views) were predicted on the basis of greater questioning of official 
governance and more acceptances of alternative political positions. Fifth, the  hypothesis was 
that belief in both conspiracy types would be positively correlated with belief in the 
effectiveness of alternative medicine (H5).   
                                                                    Method 
Participants  
In total, 323 participants (167 male, 156 female) and their age ranged from 18 to 75 
(M=36.39, SD=16.17). The majority of participants identified as White (n=222), followed by 
Asian (n=88). In total, 164 participants identified as not religious, whilst the remaining 159 
participants identified as being of some religious background. With regards to highest 
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educational qualification; no formal educational qualification (n=2), still in full-time education 
(n=29), high school certificate (n=52), undergraduate degree (n=140), postgraduate degree 
(n=81), and other qualification (n=19).  
Materials 
1. CTs:  This consisted of 20 statements of conspiracy theories either chosen from previous 
conspiracy belief scales (i.e. Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale, Brotherton et al. 2013; 
Psychiatric Skepticism Scale, Swami, Persaud & Furnham, 2011). Half were political 
because they involved action by a government, and half were medical because they 
involved action by the medical or pharmaceutical industry.. The order of presentation of 
each statement was randomized for each participant. Examples of the political CTs were: 
A small, secret group of people is responsible for making all major world decisions, such 
as going to war.; Governments are spying on us through our computers and cell phones; 
Global warming is a hoax designed by governments in order to introduce higher taxation, 
controls on lifestyle and a more authoritarian government. Examples of the medical CTs 
were: Health officials know that vaccines cause illnesses but hide this from the public in 
order to increase pharmaceutical profits; The medical industry is withholding a cure for 
cancer in order to increase its profits.    Experiments involving new drugs are routinely 
carried out on the public without their knowledge or consent.   
2. Self-esteem scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1965). RSES includes 10 items measuring self-worth.  
Higher scores indicate higher self-esteem and the RSES has been shown to have high 
internal consistency (Robinson & Shaver, 1973).  
3. Personality (Gosling, Rentfrow & Swann, 2003) The TIPI includes 10 items that assess the 
Big Five personality factors. Participants were asked the extent to which a pair of traits 
applied to them and rated on a 7-point scale from 1 (disagree strongly) to 7 (agree strongly).  
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4.  Demographic, personality and attitude questions. These included age, gender, highest 
education level, ethnicity, religious views (not at all to very), political views (i.e. more left 
or right wing) and opinions on the use of alternative medicine (i.e. how beneficial they 
believe its use to be). Political views were measured firstly by asking how often the 
participant tends to vote in elections, and secondly on a 10-point scale ranging from 1 
(extremely left wing) to 10 (extremely right wing), with the option of selecting “no political 
views”. Views on the effectiveness of alternative medicine were measured on a 5-point 
scale from 1 (not effective at all) to 5 (extremely effective), with higher scores indicating 
higher belief in the effectiveness of alternative medicine.  
Procedure   
Psychology Ethics Committee granted approval for this study and all participants gave 
informed consent. The task was an online questionnaire designed on Qualtrics. Participants 
completed the questionnaire online on either a computer or a smart phone device. It took 
approximately 10 minutes to complete.  
 
                                                                     Results 
Descriptive statistics and bivariate Pearson correlations  
Descriptive statistics (M and SD) and inter-correlations for all measures except gender and 
religion are shown in Table 1. Cronbach’s alpha values for the 10 political and 10 medical 
conspiracy theories were both 0.90, demonstrating high internal consistencies for both belief 
measures (see Table 1 for Cronbach’s alpha values for other measures). An average political  
and medical conspiracy belief score for each participant was therefore computed.  
The correlations showed that belief in both political and medical conspiracy theories 
were significantly positively correlated with political attitudes (i.e. more right-wing views) and 
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the effectiveness of alternative medicine, and significantly negatively correlated with self-
esteem, conscientiousness and age. These findings only fully support hypothesis 1B and 
hypothesis 5.  In addition, only belief in political conspiracies was significantly negatively 
correlated with agreeableness and emotional stability, and only belief in medical conspiracies 
was positively correlated with education qualification (i.e. higher intelligence; see Table 1).  
Additional analyses were conducted based on the summed belief score for each 
participant for all 20 conspiracies used, labelled ‘overall conspiracy belief’. Overall conspiracy 
belief was significantly negatively correlated with self-esteem, Conscientiousness and age, and 
significantly positively correlated with political views (i.e. more right-wing), education 
qualification (i.e. higher intelligence) and belief in the effectiveness of alternative medicine 
(See Table 1).  Previous studies have suggested a U-shaped relationship between political 
ideology and CTs and this was explored in the data set, by use of quadratic methods, but there 
was little evidence of a U shaped relationship. 
 
Hierarchical regressions to predict political, medical and overall conspiracy belief  
Three, three-stage hierarchical multiple regressions were conducted (all assumptions 
were met). For all analyses, demographic factors, namely gender, age, education and religious 
affiliation (dummy coded either religious or not religious), were entered at stage one. 
Personality factors (i.e. self-esteem, plus Big Five) were entered at stage two, and the remaining 
variables (voting tendencies, political views and beliefs about alternative medicine) were 
entered at stage three (see Table 2). Our aim was to investigate to what extent personality 
factors have incremental validity over demography, as well as to what extent political and 
medical beliefs accounted for more variance over demography and personality combined.  
Insert Tables 1 and 2 here 
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The first hierarchical regression, predicting political conspiracy belief, revealed that at 
stage one, demographic factors contributed significantly to the regression model, F(4,287) = 
21.67, p < .001, and accounted for 23.2% (adjusted R2 = 22.1%) of the variance in belief. 
Introducing personality factors explained an additional 4% of the variation in the belief in 
political conspiracy theories and this change in R2 was significant, F(6,281) = 2.58, p = .019. 
Adding the remaining variables to the model explained an additional 12.5% of the variation in 
the belief in political conspiracy theories and this change in R2 was also significant, F(3,278) 
= 19.19, p < .001. 
           Gender, age, religiousness, emotional stability, political views and belief in the 
effectiveness of alternative medicine were significant predictors of the belief in political 
conspiracy theories  With regards to gender, males (M=2.86, SD=1.01) were more likely than 
females (M=2.38, SD=0.71) to believe in political conspiracy theories. Also, religious 
participants (M=2.89, SD=0.10) were more likely than non-religious participants (M=2.38, 
SD=0.74) to believe in political conspiracy theories. These variables accounted for 39.7% 
(adjusted R2 = 36.9%) of the variance in the belief in political conspiracy theories. Interestingly 
the only personality variable that was significant was (low) Neuroticism. 
Regarding the second regression, demographic factors accounted for 20.4% (adjusted 
R2 = 19.3%) of the variation in the belief in medical conspiracy theories, and made a significant 
contribution to the regression model, F(4,287) = 18.43, p < .001. Adding personality factors 
explained an additional 1.4% of the variance, yet this change in R2 was not significant, F(3,278) 
= 0.82, p = .554. Introducing the final variables to the model explained an additional 18.4% of 
the variance and this change was significant, F(3,278) = 28.53, p < .001. 
Again gender, age, religiousness and belief in the effectiveness of alternative medicine 
were significant predictors of the belief in medical conspiracy theories. As with the results of 
the first regression, males (M=2.90, SD=0.99) were more likely than females (M=2.49, 
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SD=0.74) and those who were religious (M=2.97, SD=0.98) were more likely than those who 
were non-religious (M=2.44, SD=0.72) to believe in medical conspiracy theories. This supports 
the third hypothesis that religion would predict belief in both conspiracy theory types. The  
variables accounted for 40.2% (adjusted R2 = 37.4%) of the variance in the belief in medical 
conspiracy theories.  
In the third regression predicting overall conspiracy belief, stage one revealed that 
demographic factors accounted for 24.1% (adjusted R2 = 23.1%) of the variation in belief, and 
this significantly contributed to the regression model, F(4,287) = 22.83, p <.001. The addition 
of personality factors at stage two explained a further 2.6% of the variation in overall 
conspiracy belief, yet this change was not significant, F(6,281) = 1.67, p =.129. Including the 
final variables at stage three was a significant change, F(3,278) = 25.56, p <.001, explaining 
an additional 15.8% of the variance in the model.  
Gender, age, religiousness and belief in the effectiveness of alternative medicine were 
significant predictors of overall conspiracy belief. Just as with the results of the first and second 
regression analyses, males (M=2.89, SD=0.95) were more likely than females (M=2.45, 
SD=0.68), and religious participants (M=2.94, SD=0.95) were more likely than non-religious 
participants (M=2.42, SD=0.69) to believe in conspiracies. All variables together accounted for 
42.6% (adjusted R2 = 39.9%) of the variance in overall conspiracy belief.  
                                                              Discussion 
The results demonstrated strong support for a monological conspiracy belief system: 
belief in one conspiracy theory leads to belief in another conspiracy theory ( Swami et al. 2011; 
Wood et al. 2012).  The regression analyses showed that demographic factors, personality 
factors and attitude factors significantly contributed to the variance in belief in political 
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conspiracy theories. In contrast, personality factors did not significantly contribute to the 
variance in belief in medical conspiracy theories.  
Personality factors  
Self-esteem was negatively correlated with belief in both political and medical 
conspiracies, supporting hypothesis 1B, however it was not a significant predictor of belief in 
either conspiracy type. This is in keeping with previous findings (Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al. 
2011).  
On the other hand, Agreeableness was only negatively correlated with belief in political 
conspiracy theories but not belief in medical conspiracy theories, rejecting hypothesis 1A. It 
was expected that low agreeableness would be associated with belief due to increased 
antagonism and suspiciousness. It may be that agreeable people are more sympathetic to human 
error in medical situations 
In contrast to hypothesis 1C and previous research, openness to experience was not 
associated with belief in either conspiracy theory type.  An interesting and unexpected finding 
that extends previous work was that Conscientiousness and Emotional Stability appeared to be 
related to conspiracy belief. However, in the regression analyses, Conscientiousness was not a 
significant predictor of belief.  Emotional stability, on the other hand, was negatively correlated 
with and significantly predictive of belief in political conspiracy theories, yet was not 
associated with belief in medical conspiracy theories. An association with emotional stability 
was unexpected because previous research had not suggested a link. Nevertheless, this finding 
is perhaps not surprising considering that neurotic individuals are more likely to interpret 
events as threatening (Thompson, 2008), which links to Hofstadter’s (1971) traditional 
assumption that conspiracy theorists are paranoid and delusional.  
Demographic factors 
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 There was no relationship between education level and belief in political conspiracies, 
which contrasts with previous work by Swami et al. (2011) and research suggesting that 
cognitive biases account for individuals with lower intelligence adopting conspiracist beliefs 
(Douglas et al. 2016; Swami & Furnham, 2014). Higher education level was significantly 
correlated with greater belief in medical conspiracies, which is in line with findings that 
college-educated men tend to support AIDS conspiracy theories (Klonoff & Landrine, 1999) 
and was also significantly correlated with overall conspiracy belief. However, education was 
not a significant predictor of medical or overall conspiracy belief and the correlations were 
very small, suggesting that this link may be attributed to other factors. This may be associated 
with the measure used to assess intelligence. The sample used may also be restrictive. For 
instance, only two participants had no education qualifications and the majority held an 
undergraduate or postgraduate degree, reducing the generalisability of this finding.  
Being religious was a strong predictor of belief in both types of conspiracy. This 
supports previous research, and can similarly be explained by a greater tendency to be 
superstitious (Barrett, 2007; Darwin et al. 2011; Stieger et al. 2013). Religious belief usually 
involves the belief in an all-powerful being, and this can be mirrored in conspiracist belief, as 
it involves believing that someone, or a group, is governing events that the individual has no 
control over. Religiousness may also be linked to conspiracy belief because these individuals 
may be less reliant on evidentiary processes. For instance, in Lobato et al.’s (2014) study, 
religiousness predicted pseudoscience belief, and was representative of the rejection of specific 
scientific concepts. It is unclear whether belief in different religions would lead to different 
findings.  
The finding that younger people were more likely to support conspiracy theories could 
be because they are more likely to be exposed to them. For example, previous research suggests 
that media coverage is associated with greater conspiracist ideation (Kim & Cao, 2016), and 
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younger people could be exposed to more media messages through social media because older 
individuals are less likely to use social networking sites than young adults (Perrin, 2015). 
Alternatively, several of the conspiracy statements used involved events that occurred prior to 
the birth of some participants. Consequently, older participants may have heard these 
conspiracies when they originated, and so have had more time to consider their truthfulness 
than younger participants. 
 With regards to gender, males were more likely to believe both conspiracy types than 
females. This may be attributed to males being more likely to report themselves as open to new 
ideas than females (Costa, Terracciano & McCrae, 2001). As a result, men may be more likely 
to consider and accept conspiracies than women.  
 
Attitude factors  
The findings of this study also showed that there was no association between 
participants’ tendencies to vote and their belief in political or medical conspiracies. This is in 
contrast to hypothesis 4B and research suggesting that conspiracy belief predicts lower political 
engagement (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a). However, this may be related to the conspiracy 
theories used. For instance, some of the conspiracies may be too dated to have an impact on 
trust in the current political government, or conspiracies regarding the US government may not 
lead British participants to mistrust the British government. 
 However, in contrast to previous research and hypothesis 4A, more right-wing political 
views were significantly correlated with greater belief in both political and medical conspiracy 
theories, yet this was only predictive of belief in political. Left-wing views were expected as 
democratic principles have been argued to involve greater questioning of the government and 
 13 
acceptance of alternative methods (e.g. Swami et al. 2011; Swami  & Furnham, 2014), yet it is 
unclear why right-wing views would be associated with greater conspiracist belief.  
Hypothesis 5 regarding alternative medicine was however supported: greater belief in 
the effectiveness of alternative medicine was correlated with greater belief in both medical and 
political conspiracies. This was expected on the basis of such individuals potentially being 
more powerless and seeking control over their medical decisions.  This is particularly plausible 
considering research suggesting that belief in alternative medicine is linked to spirituality 
(Astin, 1998), and so these individuals may similarly attribute events to something beyond 
what it is. Because an association was not only demonstrated with medical conspiracy belief, 
a general suspiciousness of all authorities and industries may explain this link. Consequently, 
a general worldview, as outlined by the monological belief system, appears an explanation for 
conspiracist belief regardless of the type of conspiracy.  
The main limitation of this study, as with other studies of individual difference factors 
and conspiracist beliefs, is that the associations discussed here are correlational, and so 
causation cannot be inferred. Additionally, there are many individual difference factors that 
were not considered in this study (e.g. political cynicism, attitudes to authority, satisfaction 
with life). This is highlighted by the fact that only approximately 40% of the variance in belief 
in political and belief in medical conspiracies was accounted for when all factors were included 
in the model. It would also have been advantageous to have had a larger sample. Next, a number 
of variables were measured by single items (religious view, attitudes to alternative medicine) 
and it would be better to have a more robust, multi-item measure. Nevertheless we believe the 
study makes a contribution to the every growing literature on the psychology of conspiracy 
(and cover up) theories (Swami et al., 2017). 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics, Cronbach’s alpha coefficients and bivariate Pearson  
Note: ** p<0.01 level . *. P<0.05 level CT = Conspiracy Theory; RSES = Rosenberg's Self Esteem Scale; AltMed = Belief in the Effectiveness 
of Alternative Medicine 
 
  M SD N α 2 3    4 5 6 7     8 9   10   11 12 13 14 
1. Political CT belief 2.63 0.91 323 .90 .85** .97** -.21** -.02 -.17** -.19** -.14* -.09 .21** -.28** .10   .39** .10 
2. Medical CT belief 2.70 0.90 323 .90  .95** -.18** -.05 -.09 -.15** -.06 -.06 .18** -.21** .03 .48**   .13* 
3. Overall CT belief 2.68 0.86 323 .94   -.21** -.03 -.14* -.18** -.11 -.08 .20** -.26** .07 .45** .12* 
4. RSES 30.59 5.04 323 .83    .34** .19** .45** .42** .37** -.08 .24** -.06  -.04 .06 
5. Extraversion 4.36 1.36 322 .50       .01 .09 .15** .28** .01 .20** -.08 .05 -.02 
6. Agreeableness 4.77 1.14 322 .32      .12* .19** .12* -.12* .18** .00    .08 .04 
7. Conscientiousness 5.15 1.25 322 .32       .26** .16** .11 .19** -.09    .03 .01 
8. Emotional Stability 4.66 1.31 322 .48        .21** -.04 .12* -.09 .01 .04 
9. Openness 4.82 1.17 322 .24         -.22** -.03 -.03 .00 -.07 
10. Political views 4.72 2.44 311 -          .08 -.08  .14* -.04 
11. Age 36.39 16.17 323 -           -.17** .00 .07 
12. Voting tendencies 1.26 0.54 323 -            .03 -.03 
13. AltMed 3.00 1.12 323 -             .11 
14. Education  3.81 1.04 304  -                         -  
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Table 2. Summary of hierarchical regression analyses for variables predicting political, medical and overall conspiracy belief. 
Stage Variables Political conspiracy belief Medical conspiracy belief Overall conspiracy belief 
  β t p R R
2 ΔR2  β t p R R2 ΔR2  β t p R R2 ΔR2 
1     .48 .23 .23    .45 .20 .20    .49 .24 .24 
 Gender -.23 -4.36 <.001    -.21 -3.83 <.001    -.23 -4.37 <.001    
 Age -.26 -4.91 <.001    -.22 -4.03 <.001    -.26 -4.88 <.001    
 Education .04 0.69 .488    .07 1.22 .223    .05 0.99 .323    
 Religious .31 5.86 <.001    .31 5.77 <.001    .33 6.17 <.001    
2     .52 .27 .04    .47 .22 .01    .52 .27 .03 
 Gender -.23 -3.96 <.001    -.20 -3.47 .001    -.23 -3.94 <.001    
 Age -.23 -4.09 <.001    -.18 -3.17 .002    -.22 -3.99 <.001    
 Education .05 0.89 .377    .07 1.35 .177    .06 1.16 .246    
 Religious .32 5.90 <.001    .32 5.76 <.001    .33 6.18 <.001    
 Extraversion .06 1.01 .315    -.02 -0.33 .742    .02 0.41 .686    
 Agreeableness -.09 -1.57 .117    -.03 -0.51 .611    -.07 -1.20 .230    
 Conscientiousness -.06 -1.11 .266    -.05 -0.82 .416    -.06 -1.00 .319    
 Emotional Stability -.12 -2.07 .040    -.05 -0.76 .449    -.09 -1.53 .127    
 Openness .02 0.35 .727    .06 0.97 .332    .04 0.68 .499    
 Self-Esteem -.04 -0.56 .575    -.06 -0.80 .423    -.05 -0.69 .488    
3     .63 .40 .13    .63 .40 .18    .65 .43 .16 
 Gender -.22 -4.18 <.001    -.21 -3.98 <.001    -.23 -4.38 <.001    
 Age -.20 -3.80 <.001    -.15 -2.92 .004    -.19 -3.74 <.001    
 Education .03 0.68 .496    .05 0.99 .324    .04 0.87 .387    
 Religious .21 4.19 <.001    .20 3.88 <.001    .22 4.37 <.001    
 Extraversion .03 0.65 .519    -.05 -0.92 .358    -.003 -0.06 .952    
 Agreeableness -.09 -1.80 .073    -.04 -0.71 .476    -.07 -1.48 .140    
 Conscientiousness -.09 -1.62 .106    -.07 -1.31 .191    -.08 -1.51 .132    
 Emotional Stability -.13 -2.36 .019    -.06 -1.03 .305    -.10 -1.86 .064    
 Openness .04 0.66 .511    .06 1.11 .268    .05 0.90 .370    
 Self-Esteem -.001 -0.02 .981    -.01 -0.16 .870    -.01 -0.09 .929    
 Voting tendencies .03 0.64 .524    -.03 -0.67 .502    .01 0.12 .905    
 Political views .12 2.26 .025    .08 1.51 .132    .09 1.90 .059    
 Alternative medicine .34 6.91 <.001    .43 8.87 <.001    .40 8.27 <.001    
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